





















































at! the! conceptual! design! stage! to! identify! which! function(s)! will! be! lost! in! a! system! and!
approximately! when! and! where.! The! simulation! results! obtained! using! FFIP! can! serve! as!
indicators! for! the! designers! to! determine! if! the! system! is! robust! enough! or! if! more!
safeguards/redundancies! are! necessary.! Implementing! the! method! will! reduce! redesign! and!
maintenance!costs!in!later!design,!implementation!and!operational!stages.!!
The!degradation!model! is!a! low!level! failure!mode!model!that!combines!the!effects!of!
natural! aging! and! frequent! switching! conditions.! The! model! can! be! used! for! predicting!
components’!failure!due!to!specific!failure!modes!that!are!described!in!the!behavioral!rules.!The!
result! can! serve! as! an! indicator! for! conducting! repair! actions! and!maintenance! to!minimize!
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trend! is! unlikely! to! change! even! until! 2040! according! to! the! EIA.! Furthermore,! the! Central!




interest! in! reducing! fossil! fuel! consumption! in! the! energy! structure! and! in! increasing! the!
proportion!of!clean!energy.!!!!! !































from! different! sources! into! a! hybrid! system! has! advantages! compared! to! traditional! power!
plants.!Hybrid!energy!systems!can!reduce!greenhouse!gas!emissions!and!provide!highly!reliable!
electricity,!which!is!one!of!the!major!challenges!for!renewable!power!generation.!High!renewable!
energy!penetration! can! reduce! the! cost! of! electricity! transportation! as!well.!Development!of!
advanced!energy!systems!that!integrate!low!or!zero]carbon!generation!sources!will!provide!the!
needed! energy! sources! with!minimal! impact! on! the! environment.! Integration! of! low]carbon!
resources!in!a!manner!that!provides!reliable!energy!supply!is!of!particular!importance!in!light!of!
recent!announcements!on!carbon!reduction!made!by!the!Environmental!Protection!Agency.!!
























! Reliability! engineering! is! a! field! that! studies! the! dependability! of! a! product! during! its!







3.!To!determine!ways!of!coping!with! failures!that!do!occur,! if! their!causes!have!not!been!
corrected.!
4.!To!apply!methods! for!estimating! the! likely! reliability!of!new!designs,!and! for!analyzing!
reliability!data.’’!
For! the! objectives! stated! above,! the! approaches! for! reliability! analysis! can! be! both!
quantitative!and!qualitative!in!nature.!!
Commonly!used!qualitative!techniques!for!reliability!analysis!include!failure!mode!and!effects!
analysis! (FMEA),! hazard! analysis,! and! fault! tree! analysis! (FTA).! An! important! quantitative!
approach!in!reliability!engineering!is!to!identify!the!reliability!parameters!and!probability!model!
that! best! describe! the! system’s! reliability! behavior.! However,! due! to! the! high! degree! of!
uncertainty!in!the!quantitative!analysis,!a!high]level!qualitative!analysis!is!also!useful!in!reliability!
engineering.!!














will! involve! frequent! switching! between! different! energy! systems! and! switching! between!
different!control!systems.!Frequent!switching!between!the!energy!systems!may!lead!to!faster!
aging!of!the!mechanical!components!and!the!sensors,!leading!to!unprecedented!shutdowns!of!
one! of! the! energy! systems.! Failure! of! an! energy! system! can! add! an! unexpected! load! on! the!
nuclear!power!plant,!increasing!the!likelihood!of!an!accident.!Nuclear!power!plant!operation!as!
a!part!of!an!integrated,!hybrid!energy!system!requires!special!operator!training!to!understand!
the! load! distribution! and! expected! dynamic! power! generation! from! the! plant.! Human! error!
probability!may!increase!in!hybrid!energy!systems.!To!minimize!the!risk!of!component!failure,!
control!failure,!human!error,!and!to!help!improve!the!operator’s!ability!to!monitor!the!hybrid!






! The! online!monitoring! system! compares! the! data! collected! by! various! sensors! in! the!
secondary!loop!of!the!nuclear!power!plant!to!previously!built!models!of!the!system.!The!models!








each! detected! fault! and! provide! operational! instructions.! The! operator! should! follow! the!
instructions!to!conduct!repair!actions.!In!this!way,!the!implementation!of!the!online!monitoring!
system!can!prevent!future!fault!propagation.!The!customized!algorithms!will!be!both!quantitative!
and! qualitative,! and!will! be! able! to! communicate! with! other! existing! algorithms.! The! online!
monitoring!system!will!be!developed!and!verified!using!the!simulation!models!for!the!integrated!
system.!The!main!objective!of!this!research!is!to!provide!models!and!rules!for!fault!detection!and!






3.! Estimate! the! parameters! of! the! degradation! model! for! selected! failure! modes,! e.g.!
leakage.!!
1.5!Thesis!outline!!
! The! thesis! is! formed! by! four! chapters.! Chapter! 1! introduces! the! topic! of! the! thesis.!
Chapter!2!reviews!concepts!of!fault!failure!identification!and!propagation!(FFIP)!to!study!fault!
propagation! at! the! conceptual! design! stage.! The! associated! behavioral! rules! and! functional!
failure!logic!have!been!developed!for!components!of!interest.!!











! This! chapter!discusses! a!qualitative! approach! to!perform! reliability! analysis.! There!are! several!
commonly!used!methodologies!in!reliability!engineering!for!high!level!risk!analysis.!Two!of!the!most!used!
methods! are! failure! mode! and! effect! analysis! (FMEA)! and! fault! tree! analysis! (FTA).! FMEA! is! mainly!



































advantage! of! eliminating! costly! redesign! in! the! later! validation! stages.! The! ISFA! method!
integrates!the!Function!Failure!Identification!and!Propagation!(FFIP)!and!Failure!Propagation!and!
Simulation!Approach!(FPSA).!FFIP!focuses!on!hardware!failures.!FPSA!concentrates!on!software!
failures.!For! the!scope!of! this! thesis,!only!hardware! failures!are!considered,! therefore!human!
errors!and!software!faults!are!not!considered!as!potential!sources!of!failure.!!
! Similar! to! FMEA,! FFIP! also! uses! a! forward! approach! to! conduct! risk! assessment.! The!
simulation! is! based! on! a! qualitative!model,!which! fits! the! situation! at! the! conceptual! design!
stages!where! there! still! is! uncertainty! in! the! system! design.! FFIP! is! implemented! during! the!
conceptual!design!stage!by!modeling!the!system!using!different!design!views!and!by!injecting!a!
fault! in! a! single! or! multiple! components! and! traversing! the! design! views! systematically! to!
determine!the!impact!of!the!faults.!The!objective!of!FFIP!is!to!identify!the!fault!propagation!that!
leads!to!the!system’s!loss!of!function!and!modify!the!design!accordingly.!!


































, A,BehavioralModel! is!defined!qualitatively! for!each!hardware!component.! It!possesses!
two!portions:!behavioral!rules!and!functional!failure!logic!(FFL).!Behavioral!rules!are!divided!into!
nominal! and! faulty.! Nominal! is! when! a! component! is! working! properly.! Faulty! includes! the!
components! behaviors! for! each! failure! mode.! FFL! describes! the! relationship! between! a!
component’s! state! and!a! function’s! state.! ! The! status!of! a! function! is! evaluated!based!on! its!
component!behavior!and!the!detected!inlet!and!outlet!Flow.!If!the!component!status!is!nominal,!
the!outlet!Flow!matches! the! given! inlet!Flow! through! the!defined! function;! otherwise,! if! the!
component! status! is! faulty,! the! status! of! the! function! matches! the! predefined! FFL.! If! the!
component’s!behavior!is!not!described!in!the!behavioral!rules,!the!function!status!is!unknown.!!
































































































































Spurious!operation!! * ∗ ∆$ ∗ %! IF!else!! !







valve!are! to! regulate! flow!and!de>superheat! the! flow.!The!status! for! functions!are!defined!as!



































































































increases! due! to! the! conservation! of! mass.! Orifice! flow!meters! use! the! pressure! difference!
between! the! flow! upstream! and! the! flow! downstream! of! the! plate.! The! flow! rate! can! be!
determined!based!on!Bernoulli's!equation!and!industry!standard!coefficients.!
For!simplicity,!the!flow!rate!can!be!expressed!as!shown!in!Equation!1.!!!












Failure!Modes! ! Model!! Local!Effect! Location!!
Normal!! ! !"#$#%$ = !'%$(') = !*+,-*') ! !
Fluid!turbulence!!! . ∗ 01 ∗ ∆3! !"#$#%$ = !'%$(') + 56781!!'%$(') = !*+,-*') ! [1]!
Plate!fault! Orifice!plate!crack! . ∗ 9,': ∗ 3,': ∗ ; ∗ ∆9 ∗ ∆3∗ <! !"#$#%$ < !'%$(') !!'%$(') < !*+,-*') ! [2]!
Orifice!abrasion!! . ∗ ; ∗ <! !"#$#%$ < !'%$(') !!'%$(') < !*+,-*') ! [2]!
Orifice!plate!
lugging!!
9,': ∗ ∆9 ∗ ∆3 ∗ ; ∗ < ∗ >! If!(total!plugging)!
{Qactual!=!0;!!"#$#%$ = !)'?@# A≫!'%$(');!}!






9,': ∗ 3,': ∗ ∆9 ∗ ; ∗ ∆3 ∗ <! !"#$#%$ < !'%$(') !!'%$(') < !*+,-*') ! [4]!!
Flow!Pipe!leakage!
downstream!
9,': ∗ 3,': ∗ ∆9 ∗ ; ∗ ∆3 ∗ <! !"#$#%$ > !'%$(') !!'%$(') < !*+,-*') ! [3]!!!
Upstream!!Pressure!
taps!leak!








short!circuit! . ∗ ; ∗ <! Qdetect!=!maximum;! !
open!circuit! . ∗ ; ∗ <! Qdetect!=!0;! !
Fails!to!operate! . ∗ ∆9 ∗ ; ∗ ∆3 ∗ <! Qdetect!=0! !.:MassAflowArate; ARe:ARemoldAnumberAatAtheAorificeAplate; ∆3:!Pressure!difference!across!the!orifice!plate;!∆9:!Temperature!difference!across!the!orifice!plate;!f:!Demand!for!
the!turbine!bypass;!Tmax:!Maximum!temperature!across!the!!flow!meter;!Pmax:!Maximum!pressure!across!the!!flow!meter!;!t:!time!after!operation;!Qactual:!Actual!flow!rate;!Qdetech:!





! Table! 4!maps! the! flowmeter’s! status! to! its! functions’! status.!A! flow!meter! is! used! to!
measure!the!fluid!flow!rate,!thus,!when!the!meter!can!report!the!actual!flow!rate!the!meter!is!in!











































































Nominal! ! If!!"#$ = !&'!AND!!("#$ = (&'AND!
Qcorrosion_out!=!Qcorrosion_in!
Leakage!!! !)*+ ∗ -)*+ ∗ ∆! ∗ ∆- ∗ / ∗ 0! IF!!"#$ < !&'!AND!("#$ < (&'!AND!
Qcorrosion_out!>!Qcorrosion_in!
Plugging!! !)*+ ∗ -)*+ ∗ ∆! ∗ ∆- ∗ / ∗ 0 ∗ 2! IF!!"#$ > !&'!AND!("#$ < (&'AND!
Qcorrosion_out!>!Qcorrosion_in!















































Nominal! If6("#$ = (&'7 + (&'9!!AND!Qcorrosion_out!=!Qcorrosion_in!
Leakage!!! IF!("#$ < (&'9 + (&'9!AND!Qcorrosion_out!>!Qcorrosion_in!!AND! t !&'7 ≠ !&'9 > 0<=_?@& !
Plugging!! IF!!"#$ > max !&', !&'9 !AND!("#$ < (&'7 + (EF9AND!Qcorrosion_out!>!Qcorrosion_in!!
Rupture!! IF!("#$ ≪ (&'7 + (&'9AND!Qcorrosion_out!>!Qcorrosion_in!AND!!![!t !&'7 ≠ !&'9 > 0<@_?@&]!
Corrosion!! IF!("#$ = (&'7 + (&'96AND!Qcorrosion_out!>!Qcorrosion_in!AND!6 t !&'7 ≠ !&'9 > 0<?_?@& !
!
Table!8!FFL!for!Pipeline!with!2!Inlet!Flows!


































































































































































































































































































































how! the! system’s! behavior! changes! due! to! the! change! of! status! of! the! components! in! the!






































inlet! of! the! feed! water! pump! and! this! situation! persists! for! more! than! a! critical! time!




downstream! components.! However,! a! power! plant! consists! of! many! components,! thus,! the!





component! set.! Similarly,! Pipe8,! LP! Turbine! Valve,! Pipe10,! LP! Turbine,! Pipe11! and! Pipe13!
together! is! a! component! set;! Pipe9,! Spray!Water!Valve,! LP!Bypass!Valve,!Pipe12,! and!Pipe13!
















































































































































! At! time! unit! 6! the! ‘’internal! leakage’’! failure!mode! is! injected! into! the! high! pressure!
turbine!bypass!valve.!This!allows!us!to!represent!a!potential!effect!of!the!frequent!opening!and!
closing!of! the! turbine!bypass!valve.!As!a! result,! the! ‘’regulate! flow’’!and! ‘’deCsuperheat! flow’’!
functions!of!the!high!pressure!turbine!bypass!valve!transition!to!‘’degraded’’.!The!status!change!
of! the! function! ‘’deCsuperheat! flow’’! leads! the! high! pressure! turbine! bypass! valve’s! outlet!
temperature! Tout! to! be! higher! than! the! designed! value.! The! outlet! flow! of! the! high! pressure!
turbine!and!the!high!pressure!turbine!bypass!valve!are!designed!to!have!the!same!temperature!
when!they!mix! in!Pipe7.!Because! the!outlet! temperature!of! the!high!pressure! turbine!bypass!
valve! is! higher! than! the! designed! value,! the! inlet! temperature! of! Pipe7! is! not! uniformly!
distributed.! This! situation! of! unevenly! distributed! inlet! temperature! has! persisted! for!t T#$%_'( ≠ T#$*_'( = 1-time-unit!which!is!≤ t4#56475 = 50-time-unit.!Therefore,!Pipe7’s!mode!is!
‘’nominal’’! and! its! function! ‘’transfer! flow’’! is! ‘’operating’’.! Because! the! feed! water! pump’s!
‘’supply! flow’’! and! the! condenser’s! ‘’condense! flow’’! functions! are! ‘’operating’’! the! system’s!
function!is!‘’operating’’.!!
! At! time! unit! 56! the! situation! that! the! inlet! temperature! of! Pipe7! is! not! uniformly!
distributed!has!persisted!for--t T#$%_'( ≠ T#$*_'( = 51-time-units!which!is!> t4#56475.!Therefore,!




The! situation! of! corroded! material! flowing! into! the! low! pressure! turbine! has! persisted!
for -t Q47557=#7$_#$_>'? > 0 = 1-time-unit !which! is! ≤ t@4645# = 5-time-units .! Thus,! the! low!










10-CDEF-GHDCI,!and!is-≤ CJK6KLM = 20-CDEF-GHDC.!Thus!both!the!condenser!and!the!feed!water!
pump’s!modes!are!‘’nominal’’!and!their!functions!‘’condense!flow’’,!‘’supply!flow’’,!and!‘’increase!
pressure’’! are! all! ‘’operating’’.! As! the! feed!water! pump’s! ‘’supply! flow’’! and! the! condenser’s!
‘’condense!flow’’!functions!are!‘’operating’’!the!system’s!function!is!‘’operating’’.!
! At! time!unit! 62,! the! corrosion! generated! in! Pipe7!has! continued! to! flow! into! the! low!
pressure! turbine! and! the! situation! has! persisted! for -t Q47557=#7$_#$_'( > 0 = -6-time-units!
which!is!> t@4645#.!As!a!result,!the!mode!of!the!low!pressure!turbine!transitions!from!‘’nominal’’!
to!‘’blade!corrosion’’.!The!functions!‘’generate!power’’!and!‘’deCsuperheat!flow’’!transition!from!
‘’operating’’! to! ‘’degraded’’.! As! the! feed! water! pump’s! ‘’supply! flow’’! and! the! condenser’s!
‘’condense!flow’’!functions!are!‘’operating’’!the!system’s!function!is!‘’operating’’.!
! At!time!unit!63,!because!the!low!pressure!turbine’s!functions!‘’generate!power’’!and!‘’deC
superheat! flow’’!are! ‘’degraded’’! the!protection!mechanism! is! triggered!and!the! low!pressure!
turbine! valve! is! closed.! As! a! result,! the! low!pressure! turbine’s!mode! transitions! from! ‘’blade!
corrosion’’!to!‘’shut!down’’.!Its!functions!‘’generate!power’’!and!‘’deCsuperheat!flow’’!transition!
from! ‘’degraded’’! to! ‘’lost’’.! As! the! feed! water! pump’s! ‘’supply! flow’’! and! the! condenser’s!
‘’condense!flow’’!functions!are!‘’operating’’!the!system’s!function!is!‘’operating’’.!
! At!time!unit!68,!the!accumulated!time!that!corroded!material!has!continuously!entered!



















Component( P1 P2 HPTVP4 P6 P3 P5 P7 P8 LPTV P10 P11 P9 P12 P13 CD P14 P15 FWV P16 System
CD
SF
1 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
6 O O O O O O O O D D O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
56 O O O O O O O O D D O D O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
57 O O O O O O O O D D O D O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
58 O O O O O O O O D D O D O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
62 O O O O O O O O D D O D O O O D D O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
63 O O O O O O O O D D O D O O O L L O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
68 O O O O O O O O D D O D O O O L L O O O O O O D O O O O O O D
78 O O O O O O O O D D O D O O O L L O O O O O O D O L L O O O L
TFTF SF IP TF RFRF DF TF TF CDTF GP DF TF TFDF TF TF TF RFGP DF TF TF RF((((((((((((((Function
Time((
TF TF RF TF









Pipe7! function.! Eventually,! the! fault! injection! leads! to! the! system! level! effect! that! the!whole!
system!loses!its!functionality.!!!
! The! FFIP!method! discussed! in! this! chapter! serves! as! an! indicator! for! the! user,! in! the!
conceptual!design!stage,!to!be!aware!of!what!the!system’s!behavior!would!be!after!a!particular!
type!of!fault!injection.!It!helps!engineers!identify!which!function(s)!will!be!lost!and!approximately!
























































! " > $, & = ( ", &)* + $, & ,$-* ,"& & & & & &&&&&&&&&Equation&2&
Where:!
( , )f L t :!Stress!probability!density!function!!







































! Then!the!probability!for!the!component!to!be!in!a!nominal!mode!is:! " ≤ / = 0 / ;!
the!probability!for!the!component!to!be!at!faulty!mode!1!is:1! / < " ≤ 3 = 0 3 − 0 / ,!
the!probability!for!the!component!to!be!at!faulty!mode!2!is:!! " > 3 = 1 − 0 3 .!F(x)!is!the!
cumulative!distribution!function!for!stress!and!is!defined!as0 6 = ( 7 ,78* .!!
! It! should!be!noted! that! the! illustrations!above!use!normal!distributions! for! stress!and!












model!was! proposed! to! describe! the!manner! that! a! valve! could! fail! by! Strutt! [14].! In! StressH
Strength!Interference!studies!for!offshore!gate!valves,!Strutt!proposed!the!following!degradation!
model!in!Equation!3.!!
























effect! in! valves! due! to! aging! in! the! offshore! and! subsea! industry.! In! the! nuclear! industry,!
information!is!limited,!and!so!a!model!with!fewer!parameters!is!desired.!After!simplification,!the!

























normal! distributions.! However,! the! actual! distributions! for! those! parameters! have! not! been!
determined!and!could!be!other!distributions!as!well.!!!





the!same!cumulative!effect!on!the!degradation,!thus!B C = 1, ∀1C ∈ G.!!
The!probability!density!functions!for!a!and!b!and!the!probability!mass!function!for!k!are!defined!
as!shown!in!Equation!6.!Equation!7!describes!the!variance!and!mean!the!a,!b!and!k.!!
(Q = :RS ;T UV WSXYSZ[S Z;1(? = :R\ ;T UV W\XY\Z[\ Z1!
(] E = :]^_`^V]abcd:11 , D C ∈ Defg, Dhijh , ∀C = 1,G011111111111111111111111111UHlU !!!!!!!&& & & Equation&6&!!!!!!
!
2var( ) bb σ= ;!m=J D C = ]^_`^V]abcd: ZV::; ! ! ! !!!!!!!Equation&7!
( ) aE a µ= ; ( ) bE b µ= ; ( )( )
( )
2













n " = n 1= ∗ & + N ∗ &12G D CAEF: 1= n = ∗ & + n N ∗ &12G D CAEF: &1111111111= &pQ + n ?∗@:;A n D CAEF: & &11111111111= &pQ + &p?12G n D CAEF: 111111111111= &pQ + &p?12G Defg + Dhijh2AEF: 1111111111111= &pQ + @q\;r Defg + Dhijh &&& & & & & & & &&&&&&&Equation&8!
! Since! the!demands! at! each! year! are! assumed! to!be! independent!with! each!other.! All!
parameters!a,b,!and!k!are!assumed!to!be!uncorrelated.!Thus!the!variance!can!be!determined!
shown!in!Equation!9!below.!!










m=J N ∗ D CAEF: !
= [n N ];m=J D CAEF: + n D C
A
EF:
; m=J N + m=J N m=J D CAEF: !
= [n N ]; m=J D CAEF: + n D C
A
EF:
; m=J N + m=J N m=J D CAEF: != p?; Dhijh − Defg + 1 ; − 112AEF: + G; Dhijh + Defg2 ; s?; + s?; Dhijh − Defg + 1 ; − 112
A
EF: !
=p?;G ∗ ]^_`^V]abcd: ZV::; + G; ]^_`^d]abc; ; s?; + s?;G ∗ ]^_`^V]abcd: ZV::; !
= G ∗ Dhijh − Defg + 1 ; − 112 p?; + s?; + G; Dhijh + Defg2 ; s?;!
Thus,!!m=J " & !
= &;sQ; + &12G ; m=J N D CAEF: != 1 &;sQ; + &12G ; G ∗ Dhijh − Defg + 1 ; − 112 p?; + s?; + G; Dhijh + Defg2 ; s?; &
! Analytically! solving! the!distribution! could!be!difficult,! especially! for!more! complicated!




future!adjustment.!For! instance,! the!model!above! indicates!that! the! leakage!rate!has!a! linear!

















! The! total! population! of! valve! samples! is! 500.! Because! the! model! has! been!
















































































































! Figure! 16! indicates! that,! unlike! mean! and! median,! the! variance! of! the! degradation!
increases!nonlinearly!with!time.!



































































































































Distribution! 10%! 5%! 2.50%! 1%!
Critical!
Value!
Normal!! 0.656! 0.787! 0.918! 1.092!
Lognormal! 0.656 0.787 0.918 1.092 
Gamma!!! 0.631 0.752 0.873 1.035 






































































Lognormal1*195%1C I Loglogistic1*195%1C I
































! As! can! be! seen! from! Figure! 20,! the! lognormal! distribution! fits! the! reliability! function!
constructed! by! the! time! to! failure! data! well.! ! However,! it! should! be! noted! that! due! to! the!
relatively!small!population!used!for!the!Monte!Carlo!simulation,!the!fit!results!could!vary.!
! The! time!to! failure!determined!by! the!model!discussed! in! this!chapter!can!be!used!to!
specify!the!time!units!used!to!describe!a!component!transition!time!between!different!modes!as!
was! discussed! in! Chapter! 2.! For! example,! it! can! determine! how! long! it! takes! for! a! valve! to!
transition! from! a! ‘’nominal’’! mode! to! a! ‘’internal! leakage’’! mode.! It! can! also! determine! the!
transition!time!between!different!faulty!modes!such!as!‘’internal!leakage’’!and!‘’internal!rupture’’.! !



























! In! this! thesis,! Chapter! 2! discussed! FFIP,! a! high! level! fault! propagation! method! for!
hardware!components!which!describes!the!system’s!behaviors!caused!by!certain!types!of!failure!














the! designer! develop! a! clearer! vision! of! the! proposed! system! design! and! determine! if!
redundancies! are! necessary! to! make! the! designed! system! more! robust.! For! the! low! level!
degradation!model,!the!turbine!bypass!line!demand!could!be!modeled!based!on!the!estimated!
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